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I. INTRODUCTION: BERLE AS ADOPTED FOREFATHER OF SHAREHOLDER 
PRIMACY AND QUASI-CORPORATIST 
Pathbreaking and influential intellectual works are often reinter-
preted and appropriated in support of propositions and policy positions 
inconsistent or directly at odds with their authors’ views. Adolf Berle’s 
seminal critiques of managerial power and analysis of the separation of 
ownership and control provide an especially important and illuminating 
case in point.1 Berle’s work, both his celebrated collaboration with Gar-
diner Means and his individual writings, helped lay the modern intellec-
tual foundations for shareholder capitalism and shareholder-centric theo-
ries of corporate governance, the normative ideal of shareholder primacy, 
and the ideology of shareholder value espoused by later law and econom-
ics scholars, lawyers and jurists, policymakers, and managers them-
selves.2 Scholars in law, economics, business, and political science have 
                                                          
† Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, Riverside. Ph.D., University of 
California, Berkeley (2001); J.D., Rutgers School of Law, Newark (1990). Prepared for the Second 
Annual Symposium, Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law & Society, Seattle University 
Law School, January 21–22, 2011. I would like to thank the participants in the Berle Center’s 
Second Annual Symposium for comments on an earlier draft of this Article. I am especially indebted 
to Charles O’Kelley for organizing the Symposium and to Bill Bratton and Fenner Stewart, whose 
comments, conversation, and earlier papers on the evolution and historical context of Adolf Berle’s 
thinking were particularly helpful in the development of my own thinking. Responsibility for any 
errors, omissions, or lapses in judgment remain my own. 
 1. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1959) [hereinafter BERLE, POWER 
WITHOUT PROPERTY]; ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANCE (1928); 
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954); A.A. Berle, Jr., Corpo-
rate Powers As Powers In Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corpo-
rate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932); Adolf A. Berle, Modern Func-
tions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1962). 
 2. This reinterpretation of the central problem posed by Berle and Means as a principal–agent 
problem of managerial incentives and the costs to economic efficiency, rather than a political and 
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all adopted and refined the operationalization of Berle’s stylized concep-
tion of dispersed shareholding as a proxy metric, and even a policy goal 
or teleological ideal, for the relative maturation and economic efficiency 
of national financial systems, corporate organizations, and legal systems. 
The neoliberal appropriation of Berle’s incisive critiques of corpo-
rate and managerial power and their reinterpretation through the lens of 
neoclassical economics have inverted his original intentions, and the po-
litical and economic concerns underlying these original intentions are 
now more pertinent than at any time since they were originally written.3 
A great critic of the prevailing form of finance capitalism of his day has 
been appropriated to justify the ascendance of the new form of finance 
capitalism of our own. The influential architect of the New Deal and the 
American administrative and regulatory state has been domesticated 
within the confines of contemporary neoliberalism and neoclassical eco-
nomics to serve as a posthumous champion of limiting state power over 
the governance of the corporation. The deep structural flaws that Berle 
found in the American public corporation have given way to a preoccu-
pation with promoting the diffusion of shareholding as a policy goal and 
indicator of efficient, well-developed capital markets. 
                                                                                                                                  
social problem of power and control created by the large public corporation, began shortly after the 
book was published in 1932, though it initially tended to take the form of a defense of managerial-
ism. See NORMAN S. BUCHANAN, THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE 446–48 (1940); 
Robert A. Gordon, Financial Control of Large-Scale Enterprise, 29 AM. ECON. REV. 85 supp. 
(1939); Robert A. Gordon, Ownership and Compensation as Incentives to Corporation Executives, 
54 Q. J. ECON. 455 (1940). Appropriation of Berle and Means as support for the agency theories of 
the emerging neoclassical law and economics began in earnest by the 1960s. See, e.g., Eugene Ros-
tow, To Whom and for What Ends is Corporate Management Responsible, in THE CORPORATION IN 
MODERN SOCIETY 46, 67 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959); Henry G. Manne, The “Higher Criticism” 
of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 399 (1962); see also ALLEN KAUFMAN, LAWRENCE 
ZACHARIAS & MARVIN KARSON, MANAGERS VS. OWNERS: THE STRUGGLE FOR CORPORATE 
CONTROL IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1995) (tracing the development of the agency and sharehold-
er primacy position). By the 1980s, Berle and Means’s analysis of the separation of ownership from 
control was foundational in theoretical justifications of shareholder primacy. See, e.g., Eugene F. 
Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 289 (1980); Eugene F. 
Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 308 (1983); 
Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976); cf. George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, The 
Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means, 26 J.L. & ECON. 237, 240 (1983) (criticizing 
Berle and Means for failing to focus systematically on managerial incentives and agency costs with-
in the firm). 
 3. Likewise, an earlier generation of scholars invoked Berle and Means’s analysis of manageri-
al power as supporting their contentions that the postwar American political economy had resolved 
the problem of concentrated power in industrial capitalism by means of the separation of ownership 
and control—precisely reversing the argument of the book. See Mark S. Mizruchi & Daniel Hir-
schman, The Modern Corporation as Social Construction, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1065, 1074–79 
(2010). 
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To be fair, Berle’s attachment to the trust theory of the corporate 
firm and emphasis on fiduciary duties as his favored legal mechanism for 
shareholder protection provided intellectual ammunition for later advo-
cates of shareholder primacy as a legal norm and policy goal. Likewise, 
the separation of ownership and control was, and is, well-suited to serve 
as the template for the analysis of principal–agent problems and agency 
costs, which are the central problems of corporate governance and se-
curities regulation. Berle’s empirical and theoretical work did champion 
the shareholder cause, but it did so for ends far broader and deeper than 
mere enhancements of shareholder returns or even economic efficiency. 
Like many of his contemporaries, Berle’s fundamental preoccupa-
tions were not economic efficiency, corporate profitability, or even cor-
porate governance, but rather the allocation and accountability of private 
power and its legitimation by forms of economic governance that con-
strained and enabled private interests to serve the public interest.4 The 
shareholder and the corporate entity were embedded in a set of broader 
societal, legal, and political relationships and arrangements threatened by 
the immense power unleashed by industrialization. Ultimately, in Berle’s 
own thinking and in post-New Deal practice, the emergence and devel-
opment of the administrative state loomed larger and played a more im-
portant role than the legal principles and structures of corporate gover-
nance. Future generations are free to refashion and use theories and ana-
lytical frameworks in new ways to address new problems, at least when 
their content and implications are not misstated. But the double irony in 
Berle’s case is that the problems of governance, power, and accountabili-
ty that so engaged him never disappeared. In fact, the rise of contempo-
rary finance capitalism, legitimated in part by theories of shareholder 
primacy he helped to inspire, has revived these problems to an astonish-
ing degree. 
Berle’s prominent intellectual and political role as an important in-
spiration and architect of the New Deal policy agenda and its legal infra-
structure, and later as a prominent defender of the post-New Deal politi-
cal economic order, further contribute to the ambiguity of his legacy. 
Berle and Means’s foundational text on the modern large corporation, 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property (The Modern Corpora-
tion), was hailed as the “Economic Bible” of the New Deal,5 and that 
transformative period of American history has generated fierce contro-
versy over its essential character as an approach to economic governance 
                                                          
 4. Cf. id. (arguing that the concentration of power fostered by the separation of ownership and 
control was a central concern of Berle and Means). 
 5. PIERRE-YVES GOMEZ & HARRY KORINE, ENTREPRENEURS AND DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL 
THEORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 237 (2008) (quoting Time magazine, April 24, 1933). 
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and the merits of its contributions to the establishment of the modern 
American state. Berle was a member of the Roosevelt “brain trust” and 
one of the most influential architects and defenders of the New Deal 
from its earliest—and most explicitly corporatist—incarnation.6 He was a 
forceful proponent of the early New Deal’s ultimately ill-fated experi-
ment in corporatism, the National Industrial Recovery Administration 
(NIRA), leading many commentators to identify Berle’s thinking as fun-
damentally and enduringly corporatist. Consequently, Berle has been 
characterized as advocating, or at least accepting, the displacement of the 
individualistic and competitive market by large, hierarchical, and techno-
cratically managed organizations.7 Yet Berle did not play a significant 
role in the NIRA’s design, played no role in its administration, and was 
critical of its operation in practice.8 His thinking following the failure of 
the NIRA and National Recovery Administration (NRA) tended to en-
dorse, though with considerable ambivalence, the emergence of a robust 
regulatory state, which would prove to be the most durable legacy of the 
New Deal and would largely define the paradigm of post-New Deal eco-
nomic and corporate governance.9 
This Article engages these problematic interpretations, as well as 
their implications for understanding Berle’s legacy and its relevance to 
some of the most critically important contemporary dilemmas of Ameri-
can law, policy, and politics. Yet his great contributions to the theory and 
empirical analysis of corporate governance, corporate finance, and the 
dangers of unaccountable managerial power just as surely—and far more 
enduringly—informed the development of securities regulation during 
the New Deal and postwar eras, as well as its emphasis on strengthening 
shareholder rights, protecting investor interests, and promoting the de-
velopment of financial markets. Berle’s work and legacy are as riddled 
                                                          
 6. See DONALD R. BRAND, CORPORATISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: A STUDY OF THE 
NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 74–79 (1988); JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. 
BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA 75–79, 83–85 (1987). 
 7. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Ori-
gins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 115 (2008); Roberta Romano, 
Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 936 (1984); see also SCHWARZ, 
supra note 6, at 83–85 (identifying Berle as one of the leading proponents of economic “planning,” 
“collectivism,” and an American version of state capitalism, but not describing his vision of the New 
Deal as corporatist). Bratton and Wachter are careful to qualify their identification of Berle as a 
corporatist, and readily concede that the New Deal and the postwar political economy erected on its 
legal and institutional foundations was ultimately not a form of corporatism. But the concession 
highlights the problematic nature of the characterization and terminological usage. 
 8. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 7; William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking 
Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of The Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
849, 855–56; SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 88. 
 9. Cf. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 7, at 136 (“[T]he NIRA had failed, but a regulatory state 
had evolved to replace it.”). 
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with internal tensions and contradictions as the American legal and polit-
ical economic regimes that he so deeply influenced. 
Characterizing the New Deal, let alone the political economic and 
regulatory regime that emerged as its lasting legacy, as corporatist is im-
precise, prone to misunderstanding, and largely erroneous. The misuse of 
corporatism as a term not only misconceives neocorporatism as a theory 
of governance and political economic ordering, but also obscures its core 
institutional and juridical attributes along with the variety of its historical 
and existing forms across much of the industrialized world. Still worse, 
the increasingly common description of contemporary economic and 
regulatory policy as corporatist is polemical, rather than analytical.10 The 
imprecise use of the term corporatist does not merely distort our under-
standing of Berle and his times, it also, and more importantly, distracts 
our attention from the salient, enduring features of the American political 
economy and a regulatory and administrative state that appears increa-
singly inadequate for addressing the causes and consequences of our re-
cent catastrophic financial crisis. The use of the term corporatist to cha-
racterize the destructive deregulatory policies and regulatory failures that 
contributed to the financialization of the economy, the excessive power 
of the financial sector, and ultimately, the global financial crisis and 
Great Recession is perverse.11 These policies and the catastrophic crises 
they unleashed reflected the growing hegemony of neoliberal ideology 
empowered by financial and other business elites pursuing “free market” 
policy agendas. Likewise, characterizing as corporatist the federal gov-
ernment’s controversial and, in many respects, deeply flawed and unpo-
                                                          
 10. Cf. Robert Teitelbaum, An Excursion with Adolf Berle, DEAL (Jan. 3, 2011), 
http://www.thedeal.com/thedealeconomy/an-excursion-with-adolph-berle.php (Corporatism has a 
“close ‘association’ with the fascist politics of the ’20s and ’30s in Europe, much as collectivism is 
redolent of the Soviet Union. . . . Like ‘bureaucracy,’ ‘corporatism’ has a clearly negative edge.”). 
 11. Nouriel Roubini, the eminent and influential economist, has described pro-finance policies 
and legal changes as both corporatist and as the product of extremist neoliberal ideology, revealing 
the depths of the conceptual and terminological confusion in contemporary policy debates and dis-
course. See Nouriel Roubini, The Transformation of the USA into the USSRA (United Socialist State 
Republic of America) Continues at Full Speed with the Nationalization of AIG, RGE 
ECONOMONITOR (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.roubini.com/roubini-monitor/253625/. But cf. Martin 
Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 n.1 
(1987) (“[T]he term ‘corporatism’ refers to the interaction between a corporation and its various 
constituencies.”). But Lipton’s conception of “finance corporatism” does relate to neocorporatism as 
a political–economic regime in two important ways. First, he elaborates on his definition of corporat-
ism to refer “not only to the development of capital-gathering arrangements, but also to the broader 
evolution of a corporation’s relationships with its constituencies, such as shareholders, employees, 
and creditors, which are the proper subjects of any corporate governance debate.” Second, he is 
concerned with the legal rules, and thus the deployment of political power, to define the power rela-
tions within corporate governance. The political and juridical ordering of these stakeholder relations 
is a core function of neocorporatist institutional arrangements, whether at the level of firm or macro-
economic governance. See id. 
1086 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:1081 
pular responses to the recent crisis, including bailouts of various finan-
cial institutions and the Dodd-Frank Act’s reform of banking and finan-
cial regulation, is an especially problematic and emblematic instance of 
this obfuscating polemical turn.12 These policies and legal reforms bear 
no discernible relation to neocorporatism as an ideal type of regime or to 
the formal or substantive role of law within neocorporatist institutional 
arrangements and governance processes. The use of corporatist as a term 
for plutocratic politics, state and regulatory capture, and wholesale cor-
ruption of policymaking serves to foreclose paths of reform toward alter-
native forms of regulation and governance that are potentially capable of 
redressing the increasingly serious problems of instability, inequality, 
and illegitimacy generated by contemporary neoliberal finance capital-
ism.13 
Berle’s thinking was not informed by corporatist theories, nor was 
it an adaptation of corporatist-type principles of institutional design and 
governance to the level of the corporation.14 Further, his advocacy of 
national economic planning through quasi-corporatist arrangements dur-
ing the early New Deal reflected a contradictory and often vague concep-
tion of how such arrangements should be structured and function with 
respect to the role of the state, business interests, and formal rules. The 
ambiguities of Berle’s intellectual legacy can be clarified by viewing it in 
the context of the rise and fall of “countervailing power” in the American 
political economy. John Kenneth Galbraith identified countervailing 
                                                          
 12. See, e.g., DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK 
ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 11–12, 77–85, 156–58 (2011) (calling the Dodd-Frank 
Act a corporatist collaboration between government and large businesses that advantages and en-
trenches these favored corporate interests while allowing the state to channel policy through large 
financial institutions); Glenn Greenwald, The Underlying Divisions in the Healthcare Debate, 
SALON (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2009/12/18/ 
corporatism/index.html (stating that the Democratic Party and the Clinton and Obama Administra-
tions have a “corporatism” that, “[a]t its core, . . . seeks to use government power not to regulate, but 
to benefit and even merge with, large corporate interests, both for political power . . . and for policy 
ends . . . devoted to empowering large corporations”); Evan McMorris-Santoro, Ron Paul: President 
Obama is Not a Socialist, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Apr. 10, 2010), http://tpmdc.talkingpoints 
memo.com/2010/04/ron-paul-president-obama-is-not-a-socialst.php (discussing Ron Paul’s denun-
ciation of President Obama, much of the Republican Party, and broad areas of federal policy as 
corporatist); Roubini, supra note 11 (financial sector bailouts are “akin to the creation of a corporat-
ist state (like the Italian fascism or the German[] Third Reich) where private sector interest[s] are 
protected (gains privatized and losses socialized) where the government is taken over by corrupt and 
reckless private interests”). 
 13. In this sense, the tendentious ideological and discursive distortion of the terms “corporat-
ism” and “corporatist” recapitulates the earlier misuse and debasement of the terms “liberal” and 
“socialist” in post-New Deal and post-Cold War American political discourse. 
 14. But cf. JOHN W. CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE POWER: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
REFORM IN THE AGE OF FINANCE CAPITALISM 68, 73–75, 81 (2010) (discussing the replication of 
neocorporatist legal mechanisms at the firm level to create a form of “microcorporatist” corporate 
governance in Germany). 
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power in 1952 as a pervasive structural feature of the postwar economic 
order that served as a crucial means of stabilization and legitimation. 
This concept referred to the largely spontaneous and market-driven 
emergence of increasingly organized opposing interests within the econ-
omy that were capable of bargaining with each other on roughly equal 
terms. The consequent balance of economic power effected by these 
countervailing organizational interests ameliorated threats to both the 
economic and political order posed by the massive concentration of un-
constrained managerial power made possible by industrialization and the 
rise of the large publicly held corporation. Within the postwar economic 
regime of countervailing power, corporate management was situated 
within a comprehensive set of market relationships that limited mana-
gerial discretion and promoted the development of a form of corporate 
and sectoral organization, as well as an accompanying management 
style, that tamed the self-serving excesses of managerial and financial 
elites. 
In Part II, this Article provides a general overview of the distinctive 
institutional, functional, and juridical characteristics of neocorporatist 
forms of governance. Part III briefly examines some of the ambiguities 
and tensions within Berle’s thinking about the governance of the publicly 
traded corporation and the role of the state, law, and regulation in the 
broader political economy before and during the New Deal era. Part IV 
reviews Galbraith’s theory of countervailing power to highlight the dis-
tinctive and, in many ways, exceptional characteristics of the liberal 
postwar political economic order in the United States that differentiate it 
from the neocorporatist forms of organization and governance prevalent 
in much of the world during the postwar era. Part V then discusses the 
economic crisis of the 1970s and the takeover wave of the 1980s as pi-
votal in the collapse of countervailing power and the emergence of a new 
form of neoliberal finance capital. The Article concludes by showing 
how this political economic order has developed and imploded in ways 
that recapitulate many of Berle’s political and economic critiques of cor-
porate power, unregulated markets, and the role of the state and law in 
ameliorating the excesses and crises of capitalism. 
II. LEVELS OF NEOCORPORATIST GOVERNANCE AND  
THEIR LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 
The imprecise use of the term corporatism tends to equate it, quite 
incorrectly, with the deeply flawed economic policies implicated in the 
hypertrophic growth, collapse, and public bailouts of the financial sector 
in the United States and other neoliberal (i.e., non-corporatist) national 
economies. Likewise, this idiosyncratic turn in American political dis-
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course and, to some extent, scholarly commentary collapses the “state 
corporatism” of the pre-World War II period (with its dark associations 
with fascism and authoritarianism) with the democratic neocorporatism 
of postwar European social democracy and Christian democracy.15 This 
tends to preclude serious consideration of policy ideas and institutional 
designs derived from neocorporatist theory and practices that might 
prove instructive and useful in grappling with the deep-seated structural 
deficiencies and policy problems afflicting the American political, legal, 
and economic systems. 
Whereas “pluralism suggests spontaneous formation, numerical 
proliferation, horizontal extension, and competitive interaction,” neocor-
poratism entails “controlled emergence, quantitative limitation, vertical 
stratification, and complementary interdependence.”16 Philippe Schmitter 
offered a classic, succinct, and structurally oriented definition of corpo-
ratism: 
[Corporatism is] a system of interest representation in which the 
constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, 
compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered, and function-
ally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) 
by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly 
within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain 
controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands 
and supports.17 
In contradistinction, pluralism can be defined as the inverse of corporat-
ism. Conceptualized in formal, legal terms: 
[Pluralism is] a system of interest representation in which the con-
stituent units are organized into an unspecified number of multiple, 
voluntary, competitive, nonhierarchically ordered, and self deter-
mined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which are not spe-
cially licensed, recognized, subsidized, created or otherwise con-
trolled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and 
which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity with-
in their respective categories.18 
                                                          
 15. Much of the scholarly literature refers to the non-authoritarian corporatism of the postwar 
era as neocorporatism. I follow that convention here. 
 16. GUY MUNDLAK, FADING CORPORATISM: ISRAEL’S LABOR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS IN TRANSITION 17 (ILR Press, Cornell Univ. Press 2007) (citing Philippe Schmitter, 
Corporatism is Dead! Long Live Corporatism!, 24 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 54, 62 (1989); Philippe 
Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, 36 REV. POL. 85 (1974)[hereinafter Schmitter, Still the 
Century of Corporatism?]). 
 17. Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, supra note 16, at 93–94. 
 18. Id. 
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Within a neocorporatist system of governance, actors and organiza-
tions are classified within functional or interest categories and then insti-
tutionalized as some form of associational organization in order to carry 
out functions pertaining to representation and negotiation. The classic 
form and function of this type of democratic corporatist governance, 
commonly identified with Scandinavian political–economic models, is 
national trilateral concertation of collective bargaining over wages and 
other labor relations issues among authoritative centralized unions, em-
ployers associations, and state representatives at the national or sectoral 
(or “meso-corporatist”) level. Corporatist institutions also generally play 
an authoritative policymaking (or implementation) function through legal 
delegations of rulemaking and governance responsibilities to private as-
sociational organizations that act as “private interest governments” that 
enable “the public use of private organized interests.”19 
With the widespread erosion or disintegration of national and sec-
toral corporatist “concertation,” the quasi-regulatory and governance 
functions of corporatist institutional arrangements have taken on greater 
prominence and importance in enabling and enhancing economic and 
policy coordination among and within sectors, interest groups, and firms. 
Indeed, during the past half-century, juridical and institutional legacies of 
corporatism have informed the development of legal architectures and 
institutional forms of “microcorporatism” at the level of the corporate 
firm in Western Europe (and arguably Japan).20 The incorporation of la-
bor interests and institutionalized channels of employee consultation, 
voice, and negotiation within processes of firm decision-making translate 
the representational logic and legal mechanisms of corporatism into the 
juridical forms and practices of corporate governance. Institutional or-
ganization and representation of employees within the firm, whether 
                                                          
 19. Wolfgang Streeck & Philippe C. Schmitter, Community, Market, State—and Associations? 
The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to the Social Order, in PRIVATE INTEREST 
GOVERNMENT: BEYOND MARKET AND STATE 1 (Philippe C. Schmitter & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 
1985). For a useful summary of the ideal typic formal features of corporatism, see MUNDLAK, supra 
note 16, at 15–23. 
 20. But the presence of firm-level microcorporatist mechanisms and practices has been found 
to be correlated with preexisting macro-level (i.e., national and sectoral) neocorporatist arrange-
ments. See Alexander Hicks & Lane Kenworthy, Cooperation and Political Economic Performance 
in Affluent Democratic Capitalism, 103 AM. J. SOC. 631 (1998). For theoretical and empirical treat-
ments of microcorporatism, see Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Microcorporatist Structures in German Law 
on Groups of Companies, in REGULATING CORPORATE GROUPS IN EUROPE 317 (David Sugarman & 
Gunther Teubner eds., 1990) [hereinafter REGULATING CORPORATE GROUPS]; Wolfgang Streeck, 
Status and Contract as Basic Categories of a Sociological Theory of Industrial Relations, in 
REGULATING CORPORATE GROUPS, supra, at 105; Gunther Teubner, Unitas Multiplex: Corporate 
Governance in Group Enterprises, in REGULATING CORPORATE GROUPS, supra, at 67, 78–82; 
Gunther Teubner, Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and the ‘Essence’ of the Legal 
Person, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 130 (1988). 
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through employee committees, works councils, or board representation, 
are prevalent in European countries and increasingly adopted into the law 
of the European Union. 
Law plays a critical role in constituting and buttressing the institu-
tional forms and functions of neocorporatism. Even where the state does 
not play a dominant, or any, active role in coordination or “concertation,” 
it does play an essential function in creating the legal foundations for the 
formation, activities, and perpetuation of neocorporatist associations. The 
state, through law and regulation, fashions the basic juridical and institu-
tional structures that supplant contractual and market relations as me-
chanisms designed to contain and intermediate relations and conflicts 
among interest groups. Frameworks of legal rules either mandate or in-
centivize the participation in neocorporatist or microcorporatist arrange-
ments by firms, associational organizations, interest groups, and individ-
uals. The constitutive function of law enables the necessary attributes of 
organizational exclusivity, centralization, and concentration of represen-
tational and bargaining authority in neocorporatist associations and mi-
crocorporatist firms.21 Simultaneously, the legal foundations of neocor-
poratist arrangements and bargaining practices perform an essential legi-
timation function that renders them more acceptable within a democratic 
polity under the rule of law. As Guy Mundlak notes, “The unique feature 
of associations in corporatism is their exclusive, quasi-legal position. 
Exclusivity is a result of the singular, noncompetitive, hierarchically or-
dered nature of these associations. The quasi-legal position granted to 
these associations is what makes exclusivity possible within the domains 
of the rule of law.”22 
This, of course, does not assure the popular legitimacy or passive 
acceptance of neocorporatist arrangements. The state and the law ob-
viously cannot fulfill legitimation functions where political, and there-
fore legal, legitimacy is lacking. Politics and law cannot confer legitima-
cy they do not possess themselves. Causation can flow in the opposite 
direction, as well. The broader legitimacy of the state and public law may 
be compromised where, due to conflicts with widely held social values or 
serious institutional dysfunction, the legitimacy of corporatist arrange-
ments is largely absent (e.g., the quasi-corporatist elements of the early 
New Deal) or has decayed (e.g., neocorporatist countries suffering pro-
                                                          
 21. For example, legislation that extends the terms of collective bargaining agreements or 
product standards on all firms within a given sector profoundly alters incentives to participate in 
corporatist associations and negotiations by foreclosing the easy-exit options available in a more 
voluntarist pluralist system. See MUNDLAK, supra note 16, at 15–27 (providing an analytical account 
of the quasi-legal character of neocorporatist institutions and contrasting their characteristic exclu-
sivity, centralization, and concentration of authority with pluralist politics and governance). 
 22. Id. at 17–18 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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longed slow growth, rising structural unemployment, and increasing in-
equality). 
The foregoing discussion indicates how the form and functions of 
law in neocorporatist systems are distinct from the role of law in more 
market-driven pluralist systems, where law plays a prominent and essen-
tial role in constituting institutional arrangements and allocating power 
within them. The institutionalization and practices of neocorporatism at 
the levels of the national economy, economic sector, and firm thus rely 
on law’s constitutive role as a source of institutional architecture and de-
legated authority. This contrasts sharply with the primacy of market-
enabling and contractual functions of law in liberal market economies, as 
fostered by pluralist political systems and promoted by neoliberal con-
ceptions of law and economics.23 Neocorporatist law does not merely 
bridge the public–private divide, it also deliberately blurs, and in some 
respects effectively obviates, the dichotomous distinction between the 
public and private spheres that is central to the liberal tradition of law 
and political pluralism. And it does so as part of an established and en-
trenched political tradition that uses law and institutional arrangements to 
constitute, articulate, and balance power relations among social and eco-
nomic interests. 
This corporatist political tradition and legal function is almost en-
tirely foreign, literally and figuratively, to the United States. The United 
States, by virtually any definition or measure of governance institutions, 
legal mechanisms, or practices, has never been a corporatist political 
economy.24 As discussed below, the country’s brief experimentation with 
                                                          
 23. See CIOFFI, supra note 14, at 43–47 (distinguishing between the market-enabling function 
of law in liberal market economies and the institutionalizing function that typifies neocorporatist 
political economies). 
 24. Robert H. Salisbury, Why No Corporatism in America?, in TRENDS TOWARD 
CORPORATIST INTERMEDIATION 213–30 (Gerhard Lehmbruch & Philippe C. Schmitter eds., 1979); 
Mancur Olson, A Theory of the Incentives Facing Political Organizations: Neocorporatism and the 
Hegemonic State, 7 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 165, 178 (1986); cf. Martin Höpner, Coordination and 
Organization: The Two Dimensions of Nonliberal Capitalism 12–17 (Max Planck Instit. for the 
Study of Societies, MPIfG Discussion Paper 07/12, 2007); Peter A. Hall & Daniel W. Gingerich, 
Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Macroeconomy: An Empirical 
Analysis (Max Planck Instit. for the Study of Societies, MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/05, 2004) (mul-
tiple measures of corporatism and economic coordination show, inter alia, that the United States 
consistently scores the lowest on each scale of all industrialized democracies). For an argument that 
a nascent form of microcorporatism emerged in the United States following the economic stagnation 
and deindustrialization of the 1970s and 1980s, see Seth Borgos, Industrial Policy in a Federalist 
Polity: Microcorporatism in the United States, in MANAGING MODERN CAPITALISM: INDUSTRIAL 
RENEWAL AND WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE ch. 4, 65–
94 (M. Donald Hancock, John Logue & Bernt Schiller eds., 1991). As Borgos notes, however, what 
he describes as microcorporatism in the American context bears no relationship to the patterns of 
institutional development and governance practices in neocorporatist national economies. Instead, he 
uses the term to refer to weak and poorly institutionalized collaborations among state (not federal) 
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corporatist economic reforms barely lasted two years before it was struck 
down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, never to be revived in 
whole or in part.25 Even prior to this judicial coup de grâce, the practical 
ineffectiveness and collapse of political support for the NIRA and NRA 
heralded the end of corporatism as a viable and enduring approach to 
economic organization and governance in the United States. No recent 
developments in American politics, law, or economic organization have 
borne any meaningful relation to corporatism in any of its cognizable 
forms. 
Post-New Deal American politics, policy, and law are simply unin-
telligible as a manifestation of neocorporatist law and politics. Many of 
the most important and transformative conflicts over the evolving cha-
racter of the American political economy during the past three decades, 
beginning with the hostile takeover wave of the 1980s, have pitted the 
rising power and influence of financial interests against the well-
entrenched form of managerialist corporate governance that emerged 
during the post-New Deal and post-World War II eras. An analysis of the 
complex causes of this shift in power relations among sectors and elite 
interest groups is beyond the scope of this Article. It should be noted, 
however, that in contrast to the relative resiliency of the political and 
economic status of labor in neocorporatist political economies, the rise of 
finance in the United States accompanied and helped accelerate the long-
term collapse of organized labor in the private sector. Since the 1980s, 
the increasing dominance of finance and the consequent financialization 
of the American economy has produced recurring and intensifying finan-
cial crises and corporate scandals that have spurred repeated legal and 
regulatory reforms. Yet even in the wake of the catastrophic global fi-
nancial crisis of 2007–2009, interest-group politics in the United States 
has in no appreciable way displaced or even deviated from its established 
pluralist form. Likewise, changes in law and policy driven by political 
                                                                                                                                  
government, corporate management, and labor that serve to accelerate market-driven innovation and 
adjustment. Id. at 79–81. These arrangements and polices failed to endure because they accepted the 
increasing predominance of financial interests inimical to any form of neocorporatist interest 
intermediation and coordination, and represented a continuation of the postwar market-centered 
growth model that was already undermined politically by prolonged economic stagnation and 
industrial deterioration. 
 25. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). I do not address 
the extraordinary expansion and pervasiveness of economic control and planning exercised by the 
federal government during the Second World War. Though worthy of additional consideration, the 
radical disjuncture represented by wartime economic governance was far more statist than corporat-
ist and, like the forms of interventionist federal policies during the First World War, was rapidly 
eliminated with the cessation of hostilities (in contrast to Western Europe and Japan, where corporat-
ist forms of governance were retained, modified, and newly fashioned to establish political legitima-
cy and advance reconstruction in the postwar era). 
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and economic struggles between financial and managerial interests have 
not significantly departed from the liberal legal tradition, as modified by 
the enduring regulatory legacy of the New Deal. If anything, political 
pluralism and the non-corporatist legalism of post-New Deal regulation 
made the American regulatory state more vulnerable to erosion and to 
influence and capture by powerful interest groups, thus making the regu-
latory state more liberal. 
These political processes and their economic consequences would 
have been familiar to Berle and other New Deal-era reformers who criti-
cized the politics, legal foundations, and concentrated financial and eco-
nomic powers of the first Gilded Age. Accordingly, Berle’s incisive and 
influential analyses of the political economy of finance and corporate 
capitalism of the early twentieth century are well worth revisiting as we 
consider the self-destructive form taken by neoliberal finance capitalism 
at the century’s end. And the ambiguities and ambivalence of Berle’s 
critiques and policy positions are as instructive in understanding the di-
lemmas of our own age as they are for the problems of eighty years ago. 
III. THE AMBIGUITIES OF THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND 
CONTROL AND AMERICAN MANAGERIALISM 
The appropriation of the separation of ownership and control for the 
neoliberal ends of elevating the interests of financial capital in public 
policy and enshrining the norm of shareholder primacy rests on a funda-
mental misunderstanding, or disregard, of historical context and, more 
specifically, the constraints Berle confronted as a lawyer, legal scholar, 
and politically active reformer during the pre-New Deal era. First, legal 
analysis, even when deployed in deliberately pathbreaking ways, tends to 
be highly constrained by the contours and contents of received legal ma-
terials that define the established and authoritative categories, norms, 
procedural and institutional mechanisms, and range of cognizable legal 
argument. Plausible modifications and extensions of existing legal rules, 
principles, and mechanisms—such as fiduciary duties, legal hermeneu-
tics of corporate charters, or boards of directors—are often (and still may 
be) inadequate for creating fundamental reform and innovation in policy 
and governance. Second, prior to the New Deal (and even afterward), the 
entrenched status quo of American politics (and constitutional law) im-
posed narrow constraints on the possibilities for economic and regulatory 
reform. Berle’s early analyses of and proposed remedies for structural 
flaws in corporate governance, such as the positions espoused in The 
Modern Corporation, reflected an intersection of what was legally plaus-
ible and politically possible at the time. 
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Notably, Berle himself did not think of The Modern Corporation as 
particularly novel. The articulation of the trust model of the corporation, 
and thus the elevation of shareholder rights and regulatory protection, 
tracks the functional and substantive core of corporate law. That core 
was well-entrenched by the 1920s and persisted through the New Deal 
and the zenith of the technocratic managerial postwar political economic 
order. Berle appeared to endorse an embryonic form of shareholder pri-
macy over a stakeholder or public interest theory of managerial responsi-
bilities in his earlier legendary debate with Merrick Dodd about the iden-
tity and scope of the interests that should inform managerial decision-
making. Fiduciary duties, for which the trust theory of the corporation 
supplied a supportive foundation, developed within the body of Ameri-
can corporation law as a means of protecting shareholders by imposing 
flexible and adaptable constraints on managers. Expansion of these du-
ties to protect a wider array of stakeholders or to encompass more gener-
al, and woefully indeterminate, public interests or social values risked 
diluting their function as managerial constraints and turning fiduciary 
law into a means of rationalizing nearly limitless managerial discretion. 
In this sense, Berle displayed an acute and early awareness of the “too 
many masters” problem in fiduciary law, even if the commitment to 
shareholder primacy this implied was more apparent than real. This posi-
tion, largely recapitulated in The Modern Corporation, used extant legal 
materials of corporation law, and most importantly the established prin-
ciples of fiduciary obligations, while implicitly recognizing the limited 
functions for which they were suitable.26 
Berle thus saw the limitations of traditional legal categories and 
principles as mechanisms to use in achieving the broader political eco-
nomic reforms necessary to render managerial power democratically ac-
countable and to promote the public good. Accordingly, at the time of the 
Berle–Dodd debate, and even more so during the writing and publication 
of The Modern Corporation, Berle’s professional role and disciplinary 
identity as a lawyer collided with his political and policy agendas. The 
institutional and disciplinary confines of law and the harsh practical 
realities of politics and economics simultaneously constrained and drove 
his analyses of corporate power and his prescriptions to alleviate its pa-
thologies. Berle himself noted that the political and economic crises trig-
gered by the Great Depression created the exceptional conditions that 
made the New Deal’s legal reforms and transformation of public–private 
                                                          
 26. One should also keep in mind that, given the inability or unwillingness of the courts to 
develop and strengthen fiduciary duties to effectively constrain the managers of large corporations, 
Berle’s call to adapt fiduciary law to address the new problems of managerial power and control in 
the age of the large industrial corporation was not a trivial or minimalist position. 
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relations possible.27 The extraordinary exigencies and rapidly unfolding 
possibilities of reform enabled the creation of the modern administrative 
and regulatory state. That state was able to wield powers and develop 
legal and institutional forms of economic governance that had been polit-
ically—and certainly judicially—implausible in American politics prior 
to the New Deal. 
The Modern Corporation owed an intellectual and methodological 
debt to legal realism in the empirical analysis underlying its theoretical 
and policy-based arguments. While the nod to realism in much of its ar-
gumentation represented a clear departure from the prevailing orthodoxy 
of legal formalism, its legal prescriptions were fairly conventional adap-
tations of established legal concepts, forms, and norms. Yet within 
Berle’s theory, the centrality of the trust theory of corporations and the 
law of fiduciary obligations bridged an implicitly narrow conception of 
the functional possibilities of corporate governance and the larger agenda 
of protecting democracy and improving public welfare. The resulting 
theory and legal framework for corporate governance appealed to, or at 
least did not offend, the prevailing jurisprudential orthodoxy by articulat-
ing legal arguments that were ostensibly conventional while also condu-
cive to Berle’s broader reformist purposes. 
Berle’s emphasis of fiduciary duties in corporate governance reso-
nated in some deeper ways with the coming transformation of the regula-
tory state and the state’s role in economic governance. Fiduciary duties 
represent a peculiar form of law that blends regulatory and contractual 
characteristics; their animating ex ante normative principles are as gener-
al and abstract as their ex post adjudicative applications are specific and 
concrete. The generality of fiduciary principles and norms allows suffi-
cient flexibility to apply to the infinite variety and frequent complexity of 
intracorporate disputes, while also allowing courts broad equity powers 
in defining and enforcing these obligations. The abstract form of fidu-
ciary norms and doctrine was consistent with Berle’s preference for prin-
ciple-based, as opposed to rule-bound, approaches to regulating corpo-
rate and economic behavior—a long-standing theoretical and policy de-
bate over the optimal forms of regulation that has only grown in impor-
tance. 
The state’s plenary capacity to impose legal norms on the conduct 
of corporate affairs, reflected in the normative generality of fiduciary 
principles, also provided a conceptual template for a more encompassing 
legal and institutional framework for securing equity, functionality, and 
legitimacy in corporate capitalism. This vision of law reflected not only 
                                                          
 27. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 59 (1954); Brat-
ton & Wachter, supra note 8, at 856. 
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Berle’s critical stance toward unconstrained managerial power, but also 
his deeper normative and practical concerns: (1) the threat posed by cor-
porate power (i.e., managerial power) to democratic governance, and 
(2) the search for effective means to render concentrated private power 
accountable to governmental authority consistent with the requirements 
of social welfare and the public good. But strengthened fiduciary duties 
that protect shareholder interests would only have advanced this agenda 
at one level of the political economy, and only partially at that. The ex-
pansion of governmental authority and discretionary power in order to 
redirect narrow managerial self-interest toward more socially beneficial 
ends required an expansion of state power through the broad delegation 
of regulatory authority to technocratic regulators, which in turn would 
have refashioned corporate management into a new technocratic, quasi-
public function. 
Berle and Means’s famous work was thus not the apotheosis of 
Berle’s thinking about the corporation and its role in the political econo-
my. It instead represented a historical moment of extraordinary intellec-
tual and political tension between a laissez-faire form of classical liberal-
ism and the political, regulatory, institutional, and constitutional upheav-
als of the New Deal era that made wholesale reform possible. In this 
light, it is not surprising that Berle, along with most other New Dealers, 
largely abandoned concerns with corporate governance, narrowly con-
ceived as the power relations and decision-making processes within cor-
porations, to focus on the more thoroughgoing reconstruction and expan-
sion of federal regulatory power and authority over economic manage-
ment. 
This path was further consolidated with the abandonment of the 
corporatist approaches to governance and regulation in 1935–1936, the 
victim of the NIRA’s incoherence, chaotic administration, and failure to 
improve economic conditions. The New Deal’s initial foray into corpo-
ratism not only suffered from the immense difficulty of creating corpo-
ratist institutions from scratch, but also from intractable problems of con-
flict and complexity that frustrated attempts to use such institutions as a 
mechanism for national economic planning and a means to foster coop-
eration among economic interest groups. The corporatist approach also 
placed the emerging administrative state on a collision course with clas-
sical liberalism’s core tenets of individualism and competition, and with 
American constitutional and legal principles. Even the New Dealers 
within the Roosevelt Administration and Congress were divided over the 
propriety, effectiveness, and proper implementation of an American va-
riant of corporatism. Judicial hostility to the legal form and scope of the 
delegated powers underlying the NIRA’s corporatism temporarily united 
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the Court’s conservative, moderate, and progressive members in striking 
it down as unconstitutional.28 Even the more progressive Justices Louis 
Brandeis and Benjamin Cardozo were wary of, and ultimately opposed 
to, the Roosevelt Administration’s assertion of virtually limitless power 
and ability to delegate that power to large government bureaucracies that 
could potentially collude with large corporations. 
Thereafter, even prior to the epochal defeat of Roosevelt’s Court-
packing plan, the New Deal’s favored mechanisms of economic gover-
nance were regulatory, not corporatist. This distinctive feature of the 
modern American administrative state had substantial implications for 
legal and political economic development during the New Deal and post-
New Deal eras. Direct federal intervention in the private sphere and the 
implementation of federal economic policy and macroeconomic man-
agement largely eschewed state-imposed mechanisms of governance at 
the levels of the firm, sector, and national economy. Instead, American 
law took a distinctive regulatory turn, emphasizing the promulgation and 
enforcement of detailed rules by agencies and other governmental bodies 
granted broad powers by general enabling legislation. 
Although this shift is often described as the fall of the “first” quasi-
corporatist New Deal and the rise of the largely regulatory “Second New 
Deal,”29 the historical record of the legal reforms of the 1930s under-
mines this characterization. The regulatory elements of the New Deal 
emerged alongside and in parallel with the more corporatist approaches 
to economic governance, such as the NIRA, undertaken from 1933 to 
1935. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934 were vitally important regulatory initiatives of the early New Deal 
period, and their primary reliance on disclosure and transparency en-
dured as the dominant approach to financial market regulation. Though 
its demarcation and enforced separation of financial markets and busi-
ness lines diverged from the dominant forms of financial-sector regula-
tion, the Banking Act of 1933 (the Glass-Steagall Act) was an exercise in 
prudential regulation of systemic risk. It was not a form of corporatist 
organization designed to police sectoral boundaries and restrict member-
                                                          
 28. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 541–42 (invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act, 
ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (previously codified at 15 U.S.C. § 703)). But the Court’s decision in 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936), invalidating the quasi-corporatist but sector-
specific Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991 (previously codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 801–27), reactivated splits between the conservative and progressive justices, foreshadow-
ing the great jurisprudential shift toward a broad reading of the federal Commerce Clause power and 
judicial deference in matters of economic regulation. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 
301 U.S. 1, 46–47 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act against constitutional chal-
lenge). 
 29. For a classic statement of this characterization, see 3 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE 
POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL: THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT, chs. 16, 21–22 (1960). 
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ship in order to foster stable governance and self-regulation by market 
incumbents. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (the Wagner 
Act), a more regulatory approach to labor relations than the NRA’s ef-
forts to encourage labor organization and sectoral employment standards, 
was introduced in Congress in early 1934, prior to the Schechter Poultry 
decision, and was therefore a ready replacement after the Supreme 
Court’s invalidation of the NIRA.30 The parallel tracks represented by the 
corporatist and regulatory elements of the New Deal reflected the protean 
and experimental character of Roosevelt’s political and policy offen-
sives. Yet by 1935, it was clear that political support for national eco-
nomic planning and the corporatist thrust of policy embodied in the 
NIRA had largely dissipated as its coherence and effectiveness came into 
question. The political balance of policy and legal reform shifted deci-
sively toward more legalistic regulatory approaches to economic gover-
nance. 
There is an intriguing parallel between the emerging legal structure 
of the regulatory state during the New Deal and the transformation of 
corporate law and governance that quickly followed the emergence of the 
large industrial corporation decades earlier. With the waning of the con-
cession theory of incorporation and the erosion of the doctrine of ultra 
vires, state incorporation acts were revised to function as general enabl-
ing statutes for corporate charters, which were likewise increasingly 
drafted as broad conveyances of authority to directors and officers with 
few, if any, limitations on the firm’s bona fide business activities.31 Simi-
larly, although the Supreme Court had declared wholesale delegations of 
rulemaking power to be unconstitutional,32 unconstrained by any mea-
ningful jurisdictional or substantive limits, the permissible breadth of 
legislative delegations to regulatory agencies had grown dramatically by 
the end of the 1930s. The expansion of regulatory authority and power, 
however, also provoked a political backlash and ignited interbranch (and 
intrabranch) rivalries that would spark and inform the development of 
                                                          
 30. Cf. id. at 292 (contending that the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act, Wagner Act, and 
Social Security Act continued to follow the path of the “first” New Deal and “none bore the distinc-
tive mark of the Second New Deal”); see also 2 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE COMING OF THE 
NEW DEAL: THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT, 297–315, 400–06 (describing the passage of the Social Securi-
ty and Wagner Acts). 
 31. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1970, at 56–57, 69–71 (1970) (discussing the erosion of manda-
tory terms and statutory limitations on corporate organization and activities in state corporation law 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as their displacement in the 1930s by 
general enabling statutes providing default rules). 
 32. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 537. 
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modern administrative law.33 A plausible explanation for these parallel 
developments is that the increasing complexity of organizations in both 
the private and public spheres outstripped the capacity of legislation to 
govern them though detailed enactments. The increasing generality of 
enabling laws was one result of this burgeoning complexity in organiza-
tional structures, operations, and tasks. The increasing complexity of 
corporate affairs, on the one hand, and regulatory policies and rules, on 
the other, were often mutually reinforcing and complementary, each em-
phasizing technocratic specialization within their respective organiza-
tions. 
In the policy domain of corporate governance, the most important 
of the New Deal regulatory initiatives was, of course, the development of 
federal securities regulation under the administration of the SEC follow-
ing the passage of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934, and the Investment Company Act of 1940.34 Ironi-
cally, Berle played at most a marginal role in the design of the first two 
of these laws, the drafting of which was entrusted to John Landis and 
other protégés of Felix Frankfurter. Frankfurter was Berle’s bitter rival, a 
disciple of Brandeisian liberalism’s legalistic vision of regulation and 
antagonism toward the concentration of political and economic power by 
large organizations in both the public and private spheres.35 Berle’s res-
ervations about and criticisms of the emerging regime of securities law 
and regulation may thus have been influenced by personal pique over 
defeats in administrative infighting, but they were also consistent with 
his long-standing intellectual convictions favoring principle-based regu-
lation and the exercise of broad, flexible governmental powers over 
business. He found himself allied with Wall Street bankers in his critical 
attitude toward the complex and prescriptive rule-based approach to reg-
ulation and economic governance represented by the new securities laws 
and SEC rulemaking. 
The Glass-Steagall Act’s separation of commercial banking and the 
securities business defined the scope and permissible participants in dif-
                                                          
 33. See generally Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 
COLUM. L. REV. 260, 268–72 (1978) (analyzing the tensions between the New Deal’s expansion of 
regulatory authority and established notions of the rule of law, and reviewing the resulting political 
conflicts and compromises that led to the Administrative Procedure Act). Of course, for political and 
constitutional reasons, regulatory-enabling statutes never achieved the level of permissiveness 
reached by corporation law, with its generally contentless chartering provisions allowing firms to 
pursue virtually any business activity and default rules supplied against the backdrop of legally 
sanctioned opt-out powers granted to the board. 
 34. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006); Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2006); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-
64 (2006). 
 35. See SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 107–08. 
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ferent financial markets, but did so as a means of controlling systemic 
risk and moral hazard in the financial sector. This control became even 
more essential following the creation of the FDIC and bank deposit in-
surance to prevent bank runs like those that devastated the banking sys-
tem during the early 1930s. Neither Glass-Steagall nor the new disclo-
sure regime under federal securities regulation created or imposed any-
thing resembling an encompassing corporatist form of associational in-
terest representation or sectoral governance. The overriding goal of this 
legislation and regulation was to enable markets, as opposed to displac-
ing markets and contractual governance through state-sanctioned hierar-
chical institutions.36 
Other sector-specific governmental bodies set up to regulate prices 
(including interest rates in some segments of the banking sector and 
commissions in securities trading) and market entry were not corporatist 
in structure or operation. The New Deal’s legacies of sectoral regulation 
became infamous for creating regulatory cartels of, and susceptibility to 
capture by, incumbent firms.37 But corporatism is not synonymous with 
capture, and regulatory capture does not transform a regulatory body into 
a corporatist one. This unparalleled period of institution building and 
regulatory expansion marked the true origins of the modern American 
state, which was legally and institutionally distinctive and also compara-
tively belated. The resulting regulatory regime would transform the 
American political economy, and thus the governance of the large pub-
licly traded corporation, but it was never corporatist in its intellectual and 
                                                          
 36. Cf. CIOFFI, supra note 14, at 43–47 (distinguishing the market-enabling form of regulation 
characteristic of the United States from neocorporatist forms of regulation and governance that dis-
place contractual and market relations). 
 37. Indeed, this form of regulation would later spark a political backlash that began the process 
of deregulation during the 1970s, and it was directed at precisely those sectors where regulatory 
cartels and capture had turned the regulatory apparatus into a means of rent-seeking contrary to the 
public good. See, e.g., THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE 
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979) (critiquing post-New Deal “interest group liberalism” as leading to 
regulatory and state capture by well-organized, resource-rich groups and as corrosive of American 
liberalism as a governing philosophy and programmatic agenda); George J. Stigler, The Theory of 
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (critiquing regulation as a form of 
“state failure” and private rent-seeking, focusing on protected markets and regulatory cartels created 
and entrenched by regulation that favors large firms and government officials due to their coherent 
interests, organizational advantages, and control over economic resources and coercive state power); 
cf. STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) (discussing theoretical regulation 
dismissing the “excess competition” theory of regulation influential during the New Deal and post-
war eras, and criticizing price and market entry and allocation regulation as often “mismatched” to 
sector-specific policy problems); MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF 
DEREGULATION (1985) (empirical study of deregulation of the trucking, airline, and rail sectors 
arguing that bureaucrats’ policy preferences and beliefs often facilitated deregulation in ways that 
deviated from the narrow economic interests underlying economic models and public-choice theo-
ries of regulation). 
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programmatic origins or in its later development. The distinctiveness of 
the American political–economic model and its failure to develop along a 
neocorporatist path is elucidated by the concept and development of 
countervailing power in the American economy during the postwar era. 
IV. COUNTERVAILING POWER, AMERICAN LIBERALISM, AND THE RISE 
AND FALL OF THE POST-NEW DEAL ORDER 
The hegemonic dominance of shareholder primacy in legal and pol-
icy discourse followed the decay and disintegration of the New Deal coa-
lition during the latter 1960s, the collapse of the postwar “labor-capital 
accord” and Keynesian macroeconomic policy in the 1970s, and the as-
cendance of neoliberalism and the financial sector in politics and busi-
ness during the 1980s. John Kenneth Galbraith’s theory and presciently 
incisive analysis of countervailing power’s strengths and weaknesses 
reveals how distinct the American political economy was, structurally 
and functionally, from a neocorporatist regime and why that political 
economic order turned out to be so fragile.38 Relations of countervailing 
power among increasingly organized opposing interests were a defining 
feature of the American political economy and the governance of large 
public firms during the New Deal and post-New Deal eras. The most im-
portant of these opposing forces—managers, shareholders and other fi-
nancial interests, strong unions and organized labor relations, and regula-
tors and other officials of the administrative state—were the most in-
fluential groups within the polity. Their power was instantiated and exer-
cised largely within the private sphere, autonomously from the state. 
Galbraith set out an economic logic by which countervailing power 
proliferated throughout the political economy, with the organized power 
of an existing group driving the formation of an opposing group as 
weaker constituencies sought to organize to more effectively bargain 
with their more powerful and organized counterparts. The import of 
countervailing power to corporate governance, as well as Berle’s contri-
butions to its theory and practice, is threefold. First, countervailing pow-
er as manifest in the postwar era was largely, if not entirely, the product 
of voluntarist market-driven organization within the private sphere. 
Second, countervailing power was categorically distinct from corporatist 
and neocorporatist forms of political economic organization and consis-
tent with Berle’s own thinking about economic power and governance, 
                                                          
 38. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING 
POWER (Sentry ed., 1962) (1952) [hereinafter GALBRAITH, COUNTERVAILING POWER]. Though his 
later books, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1958) and THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967), became far 
more famous, Countervailing Power introduced many, and arguably most, of the ideas and themes 
that he would popularize in his later work. 
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including the governance of the firm. Third, Galbraith also noted that the 
flaws of countervailing power as a form of economic ordering made it 
both prone and vulnerable to the inflationary spirals that would ultimate-
ly prove to be its undoing. 
Galbraith sought to explain the apparent “paradox of the unexer-
cised power of the large corporation.” He argued that even as competi-
tion withered as a constraint on large, oligopolistic firms and economic 
power became increasingly concentrated among their managers, the ex-
ercise of that concentrated power had not become oppressive or dysfunc-
tional in practice as many (including Berle) had feared.39 The restraints 
on private economic power took the form of countervailing power, “nur-
tured by the same process of concentration which impaired or destroyed 
competition,” which held in check the power of large corporations and 
those who ran them.40 Galbraith further argued that under relations of 
industrial capitalism: 
[P]rivate economic power is held in check by . . . those who are sub-
ject to it. The first begets the second. . . . The two develop together, 
not in precise step but in such manner that there can be no doubt 
that the one is in response to the other.41 
An important implication follows from the logic of mutual concen-
tration and dyadic opposition set out by Galbraith. Just as competition in 
neoclassical markets is self-generating and self-regulating: 
Countervailing power is also a self-generating force . . . the tenden-
cy of power to be organized in response to a given position of pow-
er is the vital characteristic of the phenomenon . . . . [P]ower on one 
side of a market creates both the need for, and the prospect of re-
ward to, the exercise of countervailing power from the other side. 
This means that, as a common rule, we can rely on countervailing 
power to appear as a curb on economic power.42 
This theory of self-generating countervailing power thus describes 
an economic system that is largely self-regulating, and therefore does not 
require pervasive and intensive state intervention and control of private 
economic matters. By happy operation of this functionalist logic, Gal-
braith argued that the largely self-regulating character of the market and 
private sector remained intact, though in a new form that made a virtue 
                                                          
 39. GALBRAITH, COUNTERVAILING POWER, supra note 38, at 108–09. Although he pronounces 
optimism that this salutary state of affairs could be maintained if the lessons of countervailing power 
were learned and properly applied, he also raises serious concerns about political capacities to do 
just that. 
 40. Id. at 111. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 113. 
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of large-scale organizations and concentrated power. This theory of 
largely spontaneous, organizationally based ordering is quite close to 
Berle’s own conception of groups, functionally specialized organiza-
tions, and social forces as beneficially balanced in “equipoise.”43 Liberal 
economics was reconciled with economic modernity, preserving the core 
attributes of a market-driven economy and rendering moot much of the 
debate over the appropriate extent of state intervention in the economy. 
The postwar political economy was not hurtling inexorably down the 
road to socialism and serfdom, but was instead on the stable path toward 
the technocratic management of countervailing power relations. 
This conception of how power and conflict are structured in an in-
dustrial society (at least during the postwar decades) follows neither the 
Madisonian vision of ever-splintering factions with divergent interests 
cycling through ever-changing pluralist coalitions,44 nor the more delibe-
rately structured and state-sanctioned designation, empowerment, or 
concertation of groups characterizing neocorporatist political economies. 
What differentiated the logic of countervailing power from pluralism was 
(1) the relentless movement toward organization and centralization of 
power and (2) the developmental process of dyadic opposition to the 
power of other organized interests. Like Berle’s vision of the corporation 
embedded within the constraints and demands of the regulatory state, 
Galbraith’s conception of countervailing power accepts large-scale or-
ganizations as historical facts. Both were simultaneously modern and 
quintessential reflections of the postwar consensus among much of the 
American elite. 
Galbraith did recognize that the countervailing group could be too 
small or weak to organize effectively. In such cases, the theory of coun-
tervailing power provided a justification for state action through regula-
tion.45 Federal labor relations laws promoting union organization and 
                                                          
 43. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 1, at 88, 92. But when comparing it to 
Galbraith’s dynamic understanding of countervailing power, Berle’s conception of equipoise appears 
essentially static, with its balance undisturbed and founded on public consensus on social values and 
collective goals. 
 44. In another example of isomorphic developments across the public–private divide, the pri-
vate sphere structured by relations of countervailing power loses its fragmented pluralist character, 
and it begins to resemble the structural bargaining relationships within the political institutions and 
the constitutional structure of the public sphere. 
 45. But the move from “self-generating” countervailing power to state intervention that creates 
or imitates its hypothetical effects opens an array of ambiguities and practical problems in applica-
tion. First, the theory contains no clear criteria for determining when one group has acquired suffi-
cient power, or when another group has demonstrated a sufficient incapacity to organize, that would 
warrant legislative or regulatory action. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the theory 
does not require that the countervailing power be in opposing groups, leaving the standards for de-
termining acceptable and unacceptable power differentials unclear as a matter of theory and policy. 
Second, the appropriate form of governmental action remained unclear, as well. There are govern-
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collective bargaining were the most critical, controversial, and divisive 
manifestation of governmental intervention to promote countervailing 
power. Indeed, just as organized labor relations are central to neocorpo-
ratist institutional theory and practices, they were foundational to the 
countervailing power relations of the postwar American political econo-
my. And the American labor relations regime proved to be the weak 
point in the architecture of countervailing power because of structural 
flaws in the legal framework, firm-level practices, and macroeconomic 
consequences of organized labor relations that were barely perceptible in 
the 1950s, but which grew more glaring by the 1970s. 
Galbraith recognized that while countervailing power in labor rela-
tions functions well under conditions of weak demand by preventing em-
ployers from driving worker incomes down, under inflationary condi-
tions it creates a de facto coalition between management and labor to 
continuously raise wage levels and pass the added expenses along as 
price increases that consumers are willing to bear given the prevailing 
conditions of high demand.46 This transforms a virtuous cycle of stabiliz-
ing employment and equitable division of economic surplus into a vi-
cious cycle tending toward a destructive inflationary spiral. Keynesian 
fiscal policy—a lynchpin of the postwar economy and macroeconomic 
management—magnifies this problem of inflation.47 Government spend-
ing increases aggregate demand, but in the real world of politics, expan-
sionary fiscal policy is unlikely to be, and in fact was not, conducted 
countercyclically as called for by Keynesian theory. Political incentives 
favor countercyclical spending during downturns, but they militate 
against countercyclical spending cuts or tax increases during economic 
booms.48 The result is a tendency to ratchet up fiscal policy and thus in-
flation. 
Strong unions and oligopolistic employers within a fragmented 
(i.e., noncorporatist or otherwise uncoordinated and unrestrained) collec-
tive bargaining framework further accelerate inflation by ratcheting wage 
levels upward. The costs of inflation are partially externalized onto the 
                                                                                                                                  
mental interventions that serve to promote organization, such as labor laws, policies fostering sector-
al consolidation (or collusion?), or laws facilitating the formation of advocacy associations. But 
there are also legal rules, such as minimum wage or prevailing wage and hours laws, that appear to 
deliver the very benefits that would have been enjoyed by the weaker group had it been able to or-
ganize sufficiently to achieve a desirable degree of countervailing power. The theory of countervail-
ing power may have restated the self-regulating dynamics of the private sphere in a new form, but it 
also restated the policy dilemmas of when and how much regulatory intervention should be deployed 
in a new form without supplying clear solutions to those dilemmas. 
 46. GALBRAITH, COUNTERVAILING POWER, supra note 38, at 128–34. 
 47. See id. at 187–201. 
 48. Id. at 194–95. Likewise, political incentives favor inflationary deficit spending because 
politicians are far more inclined to spend than raise taxes to finance that spending. Id. 
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rest of society while the negotiating partners retain all gains accruing 
from agreement. These mutually reinforcing inflationary tendencies ul-
timately contributed to the destabilization and erosion of the postwar po-
litical economic order in the United States during the 1970s. The infla-
tionary tendencies built into the postwar American political economy 
presented an increasingly serious political and policy problem of inade-
quate restraints.49 Countries with neocorporatist labor relations and col-
lective bargaining at the national or sectoral levels had more effective 
institutional restraints to curtail inflationary spirals because the more en-
compassing scope of wage bargains between industrial unions and em-
ployer associations limits the parties’ ability to externalize the costs of 
inflation outside their membership. In contrast, the problem of inflation 
could not be solved satisfactorily within American institutional arrange-
ments. 
The exceptional fragmentation of the American labor movement 
and the narrow coverage of collective bargaining agreements was, in 
part, the consequence of the voluntaristic form of unionization and de-
centralized bargaining under federal labor laws. The harsh restrictions on 
labor-organizing tactics imposed by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, the 
product of a bitter political fight over the proper balance of countervail-
ing power, further impeded union organization. By impeding union or-
ganization, these restrictions also removed any possibility of more en-
compassing collective bargaining arrangements that have the paradoxical 
effect of enabling and encouraging wage moderation.50 From its peace-
time peak of approximately 35% in the mid-1950s, union density in the 
United States declined continuously, plummeting during the 1980s until 
sliding to barely 7% of the private nonagricultural workforce in 2009.51 
Low and declining union density reinforced the highly decentralized bar-
gaining structure and the perverse inefficiencies of American “job con-
trol” unionism that rigidly fixed job titles, responsibilities, and work 
                                                          
 49. See id. at 194–201. 
 50. Where wage bargaining covers a larger percentage of the workforce, industrial unions and 
employer associations have an incentive to practice wage restraint because they internalize more of 
the inflationary costs of their bargains. Conversely, highly fragmented bargaining produces a classic 
negative externality problem in which union and management negotiators do not internalize the 
potential inflationary consequences of collective agreements. Each individual contract generates a 
small, often imperceptible, share of inflation, and these costs are largely borne by the population as a 
whole. The resultant incentive structure encourages a proliferation of inflationary wage bargains (at 
least where a significant proportion of the workforce is covered by collective agreements) that tends 
to increase the overall inflation rate and its aggregate costs, and yet intensifies labor demands for 
further wage increases. 
 51. See Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and Coverage Database 
from the Current Population Survey, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 349 (2003), available at 
http://unionstats.gsu.edu/ (describing the data about union membership, coverage, density, and em-
ployment among private sector nonagricultural workers from 1973–2009). 
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rules through the negotiation of detailed labor contracts.52 The irony was 
that the weakness of unions not only fueled inflation, but also often im-
paired productivity and efficiency, and both dynamics contributed to the 
downward spiral of organized labor during the 1970s and 1980s.53 On the 
other hand, in countries with neocorporatist forms of labor organization 
and industrial relations, union density and collective bargaining coverage 
remained far more resilient (though both measures indicate that orga-
nized labor relations have come under pressure in those countries, as 
well, though not to the same disastrous degree as in the United States). 
This collapse of union strength altered the political terrain of the Ameri-
can political economy. As one of the pillars of the New Deal and postwar 
order crumbled, the power of financial interests ascended to challenge 
managerialism. The conflicts over corporate takeovers during the 1980s 
and early 1990s illustrate this transformation vividly. 
V. TAKEOVERS, FINANCE CAPITALISM, AND  
PSEUDO-STAKEHOLDER POLITICS 
During the New Deal and postwar period that ended in the 1980s, 
shareholders were but one poorly organized group more than counterba-
lanced by an array of others contending for political, legal, and economic 
advantage. Shareholder primacy, lying inchoate within fiduciary duties, 
was but one normative element in a complex set of political, legal, and 
economic arrangements, and could not become effective and enforceable 
without destabilizing (or absent the prior destabilization) the broader po-
litical economic structure. The ideological triumph of shareholder prima-
cy and the increasing influence and priority accorded to the pursuit of 
shareholder value in legal norms, policy discourse, and managerial strat-
egy was contingent on the collapse of countervailing power. In its place 
emerged a crisis-prone form of finance capitalism marked by an increa-
singly skewed redistribution of income, wealth, and power toward those 
privileged by their control over corporations and financial capital. The 
                                                          
 52. For the classic analysis of the emergence and legal-institutional logic of “business” or “job 
control” unionism in the United States, see Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character 
of American Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394 (1971). For an exhaustive theoretical and empiri-
cal update and elaboration on Bok’s account, see Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further “Reflec-
tions on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws,” 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1. In contrast to the 
American case, labor relations in more corporatist countries, where labor bargains from a relatively 
stronger position and agreements are often sectoral or national, tend to rely on broader job classifica-
tions and enable more flexible reallocation of labor inside of firms. See, e.g., Richard M. Locke, The 
Transformation of Industrial Relations? A Cross-National Review, in THE COMPARATIVE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 9 (Lowell Turner & Kirsten S. Wever eds., 1995). 
 53. A more comprehensive discussion of the manifold and complex causes of organized labor’s 
decline in the United States is beyond the scope of this Article. For an excellent overview of the 
issue, see generally Rogers, supra note 52. 
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1980s are generally, and accurately, regarded as the tipping point when 
the deterioration of the New Deal and postwar order finally gave way to 
the succeeding era of neoliberalism. During the 1980s and early 1990s, 
corporate takeovers triggered intense political and legal conflicts over the 
legal treatment of shareholder rights, managerial power, and stakeholder 
interests.54 These struggles are particularly revealing of the final break-
down of the postwar era’s configuration of countervailing power and the 
role of law in constituting the power relations of the new neoliberal or-
der. 
Though hostile takeovers only accounted for approximately 14% of 
all corporate control transactions in the United States between 1980 and 
1989, nearly half of all major American firms received a takeover bid 
during the decade.55 The disproportionate impact of hostile takeovers on 
large, highly visible public corporations magnified the political and eco-
nomic stakes involved in these battles for control.56 Hostile takeovers, 
along with other mergers and acquisitions, also involved vastly greater 
amounts of money than earlier merger waves, and even exceeded (in in-
flation-adjusted dollars) the enormous sums exchanged during the ex-
traordinary merger boom of the 1990s.57 A fierce struggle over a new 
balance of countervailing power was framed as a shift from the separa-
                                                          
 54. Although the 1980s were exceptional in terms of M&A activity, this was only one of five 
periods in which mergers and acquisitions soared. There had been three great merger “waves” in 
American economic history prior to the 1980s, and at least one thereafter: 
The first great merger wave in the United States followed the depression of the late 19th 
century and was fueled by growth and infrastructure. The second merger wave sprouted 
during the economic boom that followed the First World War and was driven by an ab-
undant supply of investment capital. The third merger wave, set in the late 1960s, was 
primarily motivated by the desire for diversification. This was the wave of conglomera-
tion, with very large firms possessing market share in extremely diverse industries. The 
diversification of large conglomerates became so questionable that the fourth merger 
wave, that of the 1980s, served to restructure many conglomerates created during the 
third wave. The 1990s have emerged to produce a fifth wave of corporate acquisitions. 
This wave has seen consolidation of market share and acquisition of technology. 
Glenn Yago et al., A Tale of Two Decades: Corporate Control Changes in the ’80s and ’90s, 21 
MILKEN INST. POLICY BRIEF 1, 1–2 (Nov. 23, 2000), http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/two 
decad.pdf; see also id. at 4–8, chart 1. One might add the private equity acquisition boom of 2002–
2007 to this list. Like the M&A boom of the 1990s, however, it did not represent a major structural 
change in the economy and was eclipsed in significance by the huge housing and debt bubbles of 
that decade. 
 55. Gregor Andrade, Mark Mitchell & Erik Stafford, New Evidence and Perspectives on Mer-
gers, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 104–05 (2001); see also Monika Schnitzer, Hostile versus Friendly 
Takeovers, 63 ECONOMICA 37, 54 n.1 (1996) (18% of all attempted mergers and acquisitions by 
volume were hostile from 1985–1989). 
 56. Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford, supra note 55, identify the large-firm bias of hostile takeo-
ver attempts during the 1980s, noting that their analysis “suggests that hostile activity was practical-
ly non-existent among the smaller, lesser-known companies.” Id. at 106. 
 57. See Yago et al., supra note 54, at 10, 16, chart 10. 
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tion of ownership and control to a market for control. Berle’s engine of 
managerial power had become contested terrain, and fiduciary duties of 
directors, in which he had placed such hope, became a recurrent legal 
object of the battles to control it. 
Counsel for would-be acquirers urged courts to articulate and en-
force norms of shareholder primacy within the law of fiduciary duties to 
invalidate antitakeover defenses and compel boards to accept takeover 
bids, while targets invoked the implicit stakeholder norms of the postwar 
era to legitimate their defensive tactics. Not surprisingly, interest groups, 
legislatures, and courts reacted to hostile takeovers by enabling incum-
bent boards and managers to employ antitakeover defenses and under-
mined the institutional conditions of corporate governance on which hos-
tile acquisition strategies relied.58 Perhaps the most striking and revealing 
political response to the takeover wave was the enactment of state “cor-
porate constituency” (or stakeholder) statutes that authorized directors 
and managers to take the interests of employees, suppliers, communities, 
and other stakeholders in the firm into account when responding to take-
over attempts. But these laws gave no enforceable rights or governance 
voice to these nonshareholder groups, and the omission illuminates the 
true allocation of power in the American political economy. In Delaware, 
by far the most important jurisdiction for corporation law, the balance of 
power between managerial interests and the newly assertive financial 
sector prevented the adoption of an antitakeover statute and left the 
courts to develop a complex and shifting body of case law that repeatedly 
readjusted the balance of managerial and shareholder interests in adjudi-
cating the legality of antitakeover defenses.59 
A. Corporation Law Federalism and the Fiduciary Conundrum 
The United States is unique among the advanced industrialized 
countries in that its corporation law is primarily made and enforced at the 
state level. In contrast to other advanced industrial countries, the United 
States has no national corporation law. American federalism relegates the 
chartering of corporations and the ordering of their internal governance 
to the sphere of state legislation, while the federal government has taken 
the lead role in securities regulation and labor law. This long-established 
division of legal and political competencies has produced a unique insti-
tutional dynamic in the development of the corporate governance system 
as a whole. With the increasing incidence of hostile takeovers during the 
1980s, this fragmentation of governmental authority produced conflicts 
                                                          
 58. See Mark J. Roe, Takeover Politics, in THE DEAL DECADE: WHAT TAKEOVERS AND 
LEVERAGED BUYOUTS MEAN FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 321 (Margaret M. Blair ed., 1993). 
 59. Id. 
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over the proper scope of state corporation law and its tensions with fed-
eral constitutional and statutory commitments to unified national mar-
kets—whether for finance, securities, or firms. 
In many states, antitakeover statutes were the principal political re-
sponse to the upheavals wrought by the hostile takeover era and the 
traumatic transition from the relative stability of the postwar economic 
order to the far more volatile era of neoliberal finance capitalism.60 Even 
in the absence of a strong antitakeover statute in Delaware, that state 
courts’ highly complex—and frequently unstable—case law developed 
in the shadow of the same political pressures. Thus, it sought to balance 
the same conflicting normative and practical imperatives that informed 
antitakeover statutes: the powers of directors and managers to exercise 
their business judgment in the conduct of firm affairs (including the sale 
of the firm and amending corporate charters and bylaws) versus the fun-
damental financial and governance interests of shareholders. In state leg-
islatures, the longstanding American tradition of anti-financier popul-
ism61 enabled managerial elites to mobilize labor and the public at large 
against shareholder interests as represented by financiers and financial 
institutions involved in hostile takeovers. Consequently, legislation de-
signed to curb takeovers consistently embodied a balance of interest-
group power in state politics that tilted toward incumbent management. 
The political and legal reaction to the threat of hostile takeovers 
generated three major waves of antitakeover statutes. The merger boom 
of the 1960s and subsequent fears of hostile takeovers and proxy battles 
resulted in the passage of the federal Williams Act in 1968,62 which re-
quired public disclosure of the acquisition of large stakes in publicly 
traded corporations, and the adoption of antitakeover statutes by thirty-
seven states prior to 1982.63 The hostile takeover boom of the mid- to 
late 1980s triggered the last two of these waves, which overlapped and 
extended into the early 1990s. Along with potent judicially sanctioned 
antitakeover devices, these statutes effectively moderated (though they 
did not eliminate) the threat posed by the increasing power of finance to 
the managerialism of the status quo ante. 
                                                          
 60. In this sense, Martin Lipton’s description of an emergent form of “finance corporatism” 
misses the fundamental character of the financially driven transformation of American corporate 
capitalism as founded on neoliberal market ideology and elevating the market over the hierarchical 
corporate firm as the dominant institution in economic life. See Martin Lipton, Corporate Gover-
nance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1987). 
 61. See generally MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS 
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corpo-
rate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991). 
 62. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)–(e), 78n(d)–(f) (2010). 
 63. Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 113 
(1987). 
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In 1982, the Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Edgar v. MITE 
Corp. invalidated an Illinois antitakeover statute (and by implication oth-
er similar early state antitakeover statutes) as preempted by the Williams 
Act and unconstitutional under the “silent Commerce Clause” doctrine 
because its protectionist bias against out-of-state bidders unreasonably 
burdened interstate commerce.64 Within months of the MITE ruling, the 
states began passing a “second generation” of antitakeover statutes.65 The 
momentum of the antitakeover legislation strengthened after 1987 when 
the Supreme Court gave its imprimatur in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. 
of America to at least some forms of antitakeover legislation, reversing 
the course it had set in MITE.66 The states took advantage of this new 
latitude by enacting a veritable flood of antitakeover legislation purpor-
tedly designed to protect corporations chartered under their corporate 
law, but primarily benefitting incumbent mangers.67 
The third generation of antitakeover statutes, the “corporate consti-
tuency” statutes, (also called “directors’ duties” or “stakeholder” sta-
tutes) became the most widely adopted form of all.68 A corporate consti-
tuency statute allows managers and directors to invoke nonshareholder 
interests in rejecting or defending against a hostile tender offer. They 
recognized and legitimated the interests of multiple corporate constituen-
cies, ranging from shareholders to employees, from creditors to suppliers 
to customers, from local communities to the American economy as a 
whole. Like other types of antitakeover statutes, they provide an effective 
                                                          
 64. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982). 
 65. Roberta Romano notes that the number of forms taken reflected the “uncertainty regarding 
the scope of constitutional constraint imposed by MITE rather than by disagreement concerning the 
most effective regulation.” Romano, supra note 63, at 115. 
 66. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 85–86 (1987). 
 67. In 1988, John C. Coffee, Jr. wrote: 
[T]here has been an epidemic-like character to the spread of state antitakeover legislation; 
a majority of the states have now enacted a ‘second generation’ statute in the wake of 
Edgar v. MITE Corp. and  . . . many of these states (or others) may soon move to a ‘third 
generation’ statute after CTS . . . . This activism at the state level contrasts sharply with 
the relative caution being shown by the Congress. . . . [T]he states—particularly those in 
the ‘Rustbelt’ . . . have become protective havens for target corporations, while the Con-
gress has tended more toward neutrality. For many—including most academics—the 
prospect of state regulation of tender offers threatens a Balkanized world in which a na-
tional securities market is gradually fragmented, special interest legislation is adopted 
under the transparent guise of ‘protecting’ shareholders and the disciplinary capacity of 
the hostile takeover is gradually dulled. 
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakehold-
ers and Bust-Ups, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 435, 436. 
 68. States adopted the first constituency statutes contemporaneously with a variety of second-
generation antitakeover statutes. Yet constituency statutes continued to multiply in number and 
constituted a third generation unto themselves after the second-generation statutes and other antita-
keover defenses had already diminished the threat of takeovers. 
2011] Fiduciaries, Federalization, and Finance Capitalism 1111 
means of defense against hostile takeovers. But corporate constituency 
statutes represented a departure from traditional corporate law principles. 
The constituency statute originated in Pennsylvania in 1983,69 where 
managerial and labor interests feared that takeovers would threaten local 
corporations and herald an acceleration of deindustrialization as finan-
cially weakened firms fell to raiders.70 By the early 1990s, twenty-nine 
states had enacted constituency statutes,71 and by 2000, that number had 
grown to thirty-two.72 The extraordinary political success of corporate 
constituency statutes therefore cannot be attributed to special-interest 
pleading by individual firms or to rust belt anxieties. Moreover, corpo-
rate constituency statutes proliferated even as the threat from hostile ta-
keovers was declining to the point they had largely ceased, suggesting 
that recognizing the interests of multiple corporate constituencies has an 
enduring political appeal. These laws targeted the substantive content of 
                                                          
 69. Act of Dec. 23, 1983, No. 1983-92, § 1(B), 1983 Pa. Laws 395 (codified at 15 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 515 (1995), amended by 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1715, 1716 (1990)). 
 70. See Ronald J. Gilson, Comment on Roe, in THE DEAL DECADE, supra note 58, at 358; Roe, 
supra note 58, at 339–40; Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency 
Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 26 n.47, 28 & nn.61–63 (1992). 
 71. John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and Legislative Wrongs: Toward 
Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1540–45 (1991). 
 72. Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Statutory Model for Corporate Constituency Con-
cerns, 49 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1086 n.9, app. (2000). Matheson and Olson list twenty-nine states as 
having enacted constituency statutes as of 1991: Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Matheson & Olson, supra 
note 71, at 1425. Adams and Matheson note that four more states had adopted constituency statutes 
between 1991 and 2000: Maryland, Nevada, North Dakota, and Vermont. Adams & Matheson, 
supra. The Arizona and Virginia statutes do not specify the nonshareholder constituencies whose 
interests may be taken into account by directors, but instead refer to the long-term and short-term 
interests of the firm (Arizona) and interests in the “continued independence” of the corporation (both 
Arizona and Virginia). Because the practical effect of the statutes is the same as a constituency sta-
tute, they are included here. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2702 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-
756 (2011), amended by 2010 Conn. Pub. Acts 10-35 § 10; FLA. STAT. § 607.0830 (2010); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 14-2-202 (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-35 (1993); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1-1602 
(1999); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 (1983); IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1 (2009); IOWA CODE 
§ 491.101B (2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210 (LexisNexis 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 12:92 (1994); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 13-A, § 716 (repealed 2010); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & 
ASS’NS § 2-104(b)(9) (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 65 (1996); MINN. STAT. 
§ 302A.251 (1985); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30 (1999); MO. REV. STAT. § 351.347 (1986); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 21-2432 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1 (West 
1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35 (1983); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1954); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (West 1999); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 60.357 (1988); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8 (1999); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
11A, § 8.30 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727.1 (1999); WIS. STAT. § 180.0827 (1992); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830 (1999). 
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fiduciary duties and the norm of shareholder primacy to an unprecedent-
ed degree. 
Paradoxically, the legal recognition of nonshareholder interests 
served only to entrench and empower management. The vast majority of 
constituency statutes frame directors’ duties to consider nonshareholder 
interests in permissive terms.73 While recognizing the legitimacy of non-
shareholder interests in corporate governance, the statutes did not grant 
these constituencies any legally enforceable rights, let alone representa-
tion or voice in firm governance, but they did give managers and direc-
tors a wealth of legal justifications for decisions arguably adverse to 
shareholder interests.74 To put the matter in principal–agent terms, where 
more than one principal is recognized, the agent can justify a variety of 
possible decisions that cannot be predictably enforced by reference to 
legal norms. Constituency statutes exploited for managerial ends present 
the “too many masters” problem of reconciling or ranking the competing 
and often incommensurate interests of multiple constituencies.75 The de-
bate over constituency statutes thus recapitulated Berle’s concerns in the 
Berle–Dodd debate, but this time the debate was played out in legislative 
politics and litigation rather than the Harvard Law Review. 
Managerial interests and organized labor spearheaded the political 
support for constituency statutes. They were better organized than the 
smaller, more diffuse, and disorganized groups representing other stake-
holder constituencies (e.g., local communities, suppliers, customers) and 
generally had stronger ties to state and local politicians than to financial 
interests. Labor, however, occupied a subordinate position in the antita-
keover alliance. By the 1980s, unions had lost far too much political and 
economic strength to push for enforceable governance rights or formal 
representation in the institutions of firm governance. Labor occupied the 
position of “rule taker,” and served as a legitimating fig leaf for mana-
gerial power.76 
                                                          
 73. In fact, the Georgia, Indiana, New York, and Pennsylvania statutes expressly deny that they 
create any enforceable rights or causes of action on behalf of nonshareholder constituencies. The 
Arizona, Connecticut, and Idaho constituency statutes contain language mandating consideration of 
nonshareholder interests or the long-term interests of the corporation (as opposed to short-term inter-
ests of current shareholders). Yet these statutes did not create any mechanisms for enforcement of 
this consideration by the constituencies, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how they could. 
 74. For a comparison with the European conception of “corporate constituencies,” see Alfred 
F. Conard, Corporate Constituencies in Western Europe, 21 STETSON L. REV. 73 (1991). 
 75. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making 
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 
31–32 (1991). 
 76. See Orts, supra note 70, at 25 n.47 (quoting Democratic state senators in Pennsylvania 
during the debate over the state’s constituency statute observing that although this was a law advo-
cated by and benefiting “big business,” it also provided protection to labor and local economic inter-
ests). Both the state chamber of commerce and the AFL-CIO pushed for the 1990 amendments that 
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Constituency statutes embodied the balance of interest groups’ po-
litical power at the state level and their resonance with prevailing popu-
lar values favoring economic stability and security over higher aggregate 
levels of macroeconomic growth or corporate efficiency.77 Politics at the 
state level empowered corporations chartered in a given state, as well as 
local unions, local politicians and community representatives, and parti-
cularistic local grass roots organizations. These local interests prevailed 
over distant financial institutions and a nationally diffuse class of share-
holders in the torrent of legislative politics unleashed in opposition to 
hostile takeovers and the growing economic power of financial capital. 
Notwithstanding specific instances of managerial rent-seeking through 
state legislation, the wave of antitakeover statutes passed by the states 
suggested that a far more powerful and pervasive alignment of interests 
and beliefs drove the political response to takeovers. Further, this new 
configuration of political forces seeking to constrain the power of finan-
cial interests and market pressures proved to be enduring. Rather than 
dying down at the end of the 1980s along with the takeover wave, the 
politics of company law and corporate governance at the state level not 
only defended antitakeover statutes against repeal, but also continued to 
generate new statutes through the mid-1990s. American federalism, as 
construed by the Supreme Court in CTS, supplied managers and labor 
with the avenue of state politics to achieve their objectives, and they used 
it to alter the terrain of American corporate law. 
The overwhelming state responses to takeovers contrasted with the 
absence of any significant congressional action. In contrast to the politi-
cal alignments favoring antitakeover laws at the state level, no political 
consensus or sufficiently dominant interest-group coalition emerged at 
the national level to support federal takeover legislation. Hence, Wall 
Street interests were unable to press Congress to preempt state antita-
keover law, while managers and labor were incapable of pushing through 
a federal antitakeover law. This also accounts for the striking difference 
between the widespread antitakeover legislation passed by states, where 
localized interests are more powerful, and the almost complete absence 
of such legislation in federal statutory and regulatory law.78 The en-
trenched structural legacy of federalism also constrained federal policy. 
Federal legislation in the takeover area would directly intrude on the tra-
ditional prerogatives and function of the states as the source of corporate 
                                                                                                                                  
strengthened the protective features of the Pennsylvania statute. Id.; see also 15 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 1715, 1716 (West 2001); Nell Minow, Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Boards of Direc-
tors, 21 STETSON L. REV. 197, 220 (1991). 
 77. Cf. Roe, supra note 58. 
 78. See id. at 337; Coffee, supra note 67, at 435–36. 
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law in the federal system. No legislation could emerge from a frag-
mented congressional legislative process that tends to protect localized 
interests and discourage substantial reform. The internal fragmentation of 
the congressional committee system and the veto points created by Se-
nate rules consistently hampered federal lawmakers. This structural cha-
racteristic of American politics impeded coherent policymaking on a 
subject implicating intensely local interests. 
Constituency statutes reflected the balance of political and econom-
ic power in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s, and this bal-
ance continued to favor managerial interests. Ironically, constituency 
statutes protected managers by dissolving fiduciary duties just as many 
scholars, professionals, and policymakers were proclaiming the advent of 
shareholder capitalism and a growing corporate governance movement 
began to identify and champion conceptions of shareholder value and 
shareholder primacy as central features of the American economy. While 
economists, law and economics scholars, and professionals were raising 
shareholder value and shareholder primacy to the level of first principles, 
the state legislatures were hollowing out fiduciary duties to shareholders 
and undermining the image of American corporate governance as the 
embodiment of shareholder primacy. Despite the prevailing rhetoric and 
theories of the past twenty years, legislative outcomes indicate that the 
politics of corporate governance in the United States has actually favored 
management to a striking degree. Paradoxically, the decade commonly 
regarded as the origin of a new form of shareholder capitalism, from the 
early 1980s to the early 1990s, was accompanied by a transformation of 
the statutory landscape that diluted fiduciary duties and the norm of 
shareholder primacy to an extent never before seen in American legal 
history. 
Constituency statutes, along with other varieties of antitakeover sta-
tutes, grant greater discretionary power to corporate boards as guardians 
of the interests of the firm as an ongoing entity. With the recognition of 
multiple constituencies, these interests diverged from those of sharehold-
ers. Constituency statutes thus granted directors and corporate officers 
broader discretion—and imposed fewer fiduciary constraints—in fram-
ing and making decisions on behalf of the firm. The recognition of non-
shareholder interests in fiduciary law enfeebled an already weak con-
straint on managerial and directorial conduct. The spread of these sta-
tutes (and the more limited recognition of nonshareholder interests in 
Delaware case law on takeovers) left a crucial gap in the law’s protection 
of shareholders, but did little to advance the broader social interests that 
legitimated them and provided their political appeal. 
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Nonshareholder constituencies got little from this weakening of fi-
duciary protections for shareholders—not even a seat at the corporation’s 
governance table. Jonathan Springer concluded a comprehensive review 
of the impact of constituency statutes with an incisive political economic 
commentary that parallels Berle’s abandonment of corporation law and 
governance as a means of reform in favor of expanded regulatory power: 
Proponents of constituency statutes would better serve the interests 
they seek to advance by focusing on other measures. Constituency 
statutes arguably detract attention from more promising measures of 
change such as measures with potential to change not only whose 
interests may be legally considered, but who also makes corporate 
decisions. . . . Although it is true that preventing takeovers may ul-
timately benefit constituency groups by forestalling plant closures, 
the fact that these statutes are invoked by directors casually, perhaps 
sometimes even cynically, does little to advance the case for con-
sideration of constituent interests in corporate law. . . . “However 
radical shareholder laws appear to shareholder rights advocates, and 
however hopefully they are viewed by worker rights advocates,” 
writes Joseph Singer, “stakeholder laws are not radical enough in al-
tering corporate governance to protect the legitimate interests that 
workers have in democratic economic institutions.”79 
As a consequence of the political battles over takeovers, the board 
of directors had become a far more important institution in American 
capitalism by the 1990s,80 even as the clarity and coherence of the fidu-
ciary duties that bound them became ever more diffuse and indetermi-
nate. Most states effected this disintegration of fiduciary duties through 
statutory means. In Delaware, the development of takeover and corporate 
governance law proceeded in the state courts, where judges grappled 
with the conceptual core and practical implications of fiduciary duties 
and corporate governance. The travails of the Delaware courts reveal the 
difficulties of addressing governance problems through a rights-based 
adjudicatory system. 
B. The Conundrum Continued: Interests, Time Horizons, 
and the Problem of the Paramounts 
The pair of cases that most clearly reveal the conceptual contradic-
tions within Delaware takeover law and the depths of the tensions be-
                                                          
 79. Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears, 
1999 ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 85, 123–24 (quoting Joseph William Singer, Jobs and Justice: Rethink-
ing the Stakeholder Debate, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 475, 505 (1993)). 
 80. See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE (2008) (elaborating a theory of “director supremacy” in corporate governance law). 
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tween shareholder primacy and the practical and political forces of ma-
nagerialism were not decided until the early 1990s—after the hostile 
takeover wave had ended. The Delaware Supreme Court issued a pair of 
decisions that encapsulated, and in some ways recapitulated, the problem 
first confronted in the tension between judicial deference to managerial-
ism and stakeholder interests, on the one hand, and enhanced judicial 
scrutiny and resurgent shareholder primacy, on the other. Ironically, both 
cases involved Paramount Communications, and in both cases, the com-
pany lost. 
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. (Paramount v. 
Time), the Delaware Supreme Court held that management and the board 
may lawfully reject a takeover bid when the board believes in good faith 
that its commitment to an established long-term business strategy is in 
the long-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders.81 In Pa-
ramount v. Time, Time’s management had been working out a compre-
hensive business strategy since the early 1980s, and had been involved in 
protracted negotiations with Warner Communications over a merger of 
equals.82 Two weeks prior to the scheduled shareholder vote on the 
Time–Warner merger, Paramount launched a hostile takeover bid for 
Time. Time rejected the offer and restructured the terms of its merger 
agreement with Warner to prevent Paramount from breaking up the 
planned merger.83 In litigation, Paramount claimed that Time’s directors 
had breached their fiduciary duties to the company’s shareholders by 
rejecting its more generous offer. Calling the shareholder primacy theory 
into question, the court ruled that the Time board had not decided to sell 
the company by agreeing to a merger of equals and, therefore, the board 
could consider broader nonshareholder interests in rejecting a takeover 
offer.84 Time had chosen Warner for reasons of institutional cultural 
compatibility and quite deliberately and consciously structured the deal 
with Warner to preserve the editorial autonomy, “identity[,] and culture” 
that its board and managers regarded as essential to its journalistic suc-
cess. 
The court’s decision and reasoning relied on the recognition of two 
factors that bedevil the legal analysis of takeovers and corporate gover-
nance generally: (1) the legitimacy of nonshareholder interests and 
(2) the desirability of pursuing long-term over short-term growth and 
profitability. The court noted that “Delaware law imposes on a board of 
                                                          
 81. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1990). 
 82. A lengthy recitation of the facts of the case is contained in the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
opinion. Id. at 1143–49. 
 83. Id. at 1148–49. 
 84. See id. at 1151, 1153–54. 
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directors the duty to manage the business and affairs of the corpora-
tion”85 and “[t]his broad mandate includes a conferred authority to set a 
corporate course of action, including time frame . . . .”86 Accordingly, 
under the Delaware Supreme Court’s formulation, the courts do not defer 
simply to the board’s long-term strategic plans, but to the selection of the 
strategic time frame and the plans developed within it. In Paramount v. 
Time, the board rendered a reasonable business judgment in rejecting a 
tender offer that conflicted with an established long-term business strate-
gy. 
The court directly confronted and rejected the shareholder primacy 
view. It held that a board is reasonable in refusing the shareholders even 
the opportunity to consider such an offer. In doing so, it ruled that the 
fundamental “power of corporate governance” lies with the board of di-
rectors: 
Delaware law confers the management of the corporate enterprise to 
the stockholders’ duly elected board representatives. The fiduciary 
duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a 
time frame for achievement of corporate goals. That duty may not 
be delegated to the stockholders. Directors are not obliged to aban-
don a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term share-
holder profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate 
strategy.87 
Under Paramount v. Time, shareholders as an interest group are 
neither primary nor sovereign in corporate governance. While rejecting 
quasi-political conceptions of shareholder sovereignty, the court empha-
sized board autonomy in corporate governance. It invoked the interests 
of nonshareholder corporate constituencies as relevant concerns in corpo-
rate governance,88 and it noted that courts cannot apply a mathematical 
                                                          
 85. Id. at 1150 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983)). 
 86. Id. (emphasis added). 
 87. Id. at 1154 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 
A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
173 (Del. 1986)). Compare, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659–60 n.2 (Del. 
Ch. 1988), with Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1206–07 (Del. Ch. 1987) (emphasizing 
the importance of maintaining and strengthening “corporate democracy” in construing fiduciary 
duties in corporate governance). The court also noted that: 
[T]he question of “long-term” versus “short-term” values is largely irrelevant because di-
rectors, generally, are obliged to charter a course for a corporation which is in its best in-
terest without regard to a fixed investment horizon. Second, absent a limited set of cir-
cumstances as defined under Revlon, a board of directors, while always required to act in 
an informed manner, is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the 
short term, even in the context of a takeover. 
Paramount Commc’ns, 571 A.2d at 1150. 
 88. Paramount Commc’ns, 571 A.2d at 1153 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 
493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)). 
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formula to resolve disputes over stock valuations and the adequacy of 
returns.89 For this reason, Paramount v. Time has been called a “constitu-
ency precedent.”90 Judicial diffidence in the face of complex financial 
and corporate strategy issues led to the renewed empowering of the 
board as the site of dispute resolution through internal governance. The 
reasoning of the decision allowed the court to recast conflicts over subs-
tantive economic interests as a conflict between long-term strategic plan-
ning and short-term decisions. Reconceiving the litigation as a contest 
between alternative investment and planning time horizons, the court 
held that corporate boards should be granted wide latitude under the 
business judgment rule in making these sorts of decisions. This deference 
to the board allowed the courts to withdraw from the difficult and per-
haps irresolvable issues of whose interests should be recognized (or rec-
ognized as preeminent) in these private polities.91 Yet those who thought 
that Paramount v. Time heralded a legal vindication of long-term corpo-
rate planning and the interests of nonshareholder constituencies were 
disappointed.92 The courts were drawn back into the morass of conflicts 
among constituencies and the problem of shareholder primacy. 
A mere four years after Paramount v. Time recognized the legiti-
macy of both nonshareholder interests and long-term corporate strate-
gies, the Delaware Supreme Court embraced shareholder primacy in Pa-
ramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. (Paramount v. 
QVC).93 In Paramount v. QVC, the court again ruled against Paramount 
Communications and held that shareholder interests in short-term max-
imization of equity value are primary in board decisions regarding a 
takeover bid. In contrast to the deference shown the directors in Para-
mount v. Time, Paramount v. QVC ruled that once they had “decided to 
sell control, they had an obligation to continue their search for the best 
value reasonably available to the stockholders.”94 The court’s opinion 
made no mention of any long-term strategic considerations or nonshare-
holder interests. Although the court distinguished Paramount v. Time on 
factual grounds,95 the critical difference between Paramount v. QVC and 
                                                          
 89. Id. (“The open-ended analysis mandated by Unocal is not intended to lead to a simple 
mathematical exercise . . . . [P]recepts underlying the business judgment rule militate against a 
court’s engaging in the process of attempting to appraise and evaluate the relative merits of a long-
term versus a short-term investment goal for shareholders.”). 
 90. See Orts, supra note 70, at 105 n.629. 
 91. See id. at 113–15 & nn.660–680. 
 92. Cf. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931, 
1971–88 (1991). 
 93. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
 94. Id. at 48–49. 
 95. Id. at 52. 
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Paramount v. Time is normative, not factual.96 The Delaware Supreme 
Court once again vacillated on the norm of shareholder primacy and its 
incorporation into fiduciary law, this time favoring proponents of share-
holder primacy.97 Given that assertions of corporate culture and long-
term strategies would dissolve the conceptual foundations, logical cohe-
rence, and practical utility of takeover and fiduciary duty law, the court 
may have concluded that it needed to retreat from Paramount v. Time. 
The “problem of the Paramounts” thus may be interpreted as a real-world 
experiment using Berle and Dodd’s competing positions in their debate 
sixty years earlier, and Berle did come out as the winner. The rights-
based structure of fiduciary law and judicial enforcement impels courts 
to maintain and reinforce normative hierarchies. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The problem of shareholder primacy loomed large at the beginning 
of the current era of neoliberal finance capitalism, and proved resistant to 
solution largely because the mechanism of fiduciary duties frames nor-
mative conflicts in a way that doesn’t allow for resolution. This conun-
drum, as I have detailed it, supports Berle’s later implicit skepticism to-
ward corporate governance and fiduciary law as vehicles for reform. 
State legislatures and the Delaware courts were incapable of fashioning a 
practicable alternative to the structure of fiduciary duties and shareholder 
rights based on shareholder primacy, but the implications of strict en-
forcement of a shareholder primacy norm are as socially and politically 
unacceptable as enforceable stakeholder norms are impossible under pre-
vailing political, institutional, and legal conditions in the United States. 
With the intermediate neocorporatist approach to governance through 
institutional design and representation unavailable, American corporate 
and economic governance remains divided between the market and the 
regulatory state in the balancing of interests among multiple constituen-
cies in a complex economy and polity. 
The choice is analytically the same one that confronted Berle and 
the New Dealers after the brief NIRA corporatist interlude, but the 
choice in recent decades has far more often favored the market. Follow-
ing the acute financial crisis of 2007–2009, the deficiencies and systemic 
failures of both the market and functionally specialized regulatory agen-
cies are excruciatingly clear. The problem for any aspiring successor to 
Adolf Berle or John Kenneth Galbraith is that the politics of countervail-
ing power that ordered both sides of the public–private divide during the 
                                                          
 96. Cf. Gary von Strange, Corporate Social Responsibility Through Constituency Statutes: 
Legend or Lie?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 461, 479 (1994). 
 97. Cf. id. at 496 & n.193. 
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postwar era are gone, while no plausible functional or institutional 
equivalent has emerged. 
This historically contextualized reading of Berle and Galbraith 
helps to resolve a nagging paradox in the legal development of corporate 
governance: even as normative underpinnings of fiduciary law provided 
conceptual and doctrinal foundations for legal theories of shareholder 
primacy, fiduciary duties were largely discredited as peripheral and inef-
fective in influencing corporate governance practices. In a political econ-
omy characterized by relations of countervailing power, Berle’s empha-
sis on the protection of shareholder interests within the narrow confines 
of corporate governance was counterbalanced by the range of other orga-
nized private interests within the private sphere, and thus formed one 
nonprivileged part of an economic order that, in its totality, ameliorated 
the problem of managerial and financial power. The collapse of counter-
vailing power was triggered first by the inflationary conditions and im-
plosion of the New Deal political coalition during the late 1960s and 
1970s, followed by the collapse of organized labor and ascendance of 
neoliberal politics during the 1970s and 1980s, and finally by the emer-
gence and entrenchment of neoliberal finance capitalism since the 1980s. 
The structural conditions that reconciled the two sides of the Berlean go-
vernance paradox disintegrated and left the narrow conception of corpo-
rate governance and its inchoate valorization of shareholder interests 
unmoored and dominant. 
But the resolution of this paradox confronts us with another. In the 
wake of the most catastrophic financial collapse since the Great Depres-
sion, the most significant reforms of financial regulation since the New 
Deal have reemphasized, to a striking degree, the importance of the legal 
rights of shareholders within corporate governance as a means of protect-
ing and empowering shareholder interests. This revival of shareholder 
governance rights, of which fiduciary duties are but one component, is 
part of a deeper reform of the structural attributes of American corporate 
governance that relies on greater representational power for shareholders 
within firm governance, but remains firmly within the political economic 
paradigm of contemporary finance capitalism. This potentially historic 
development represents a contemporary struggle over countervailing 
power, but one fought out in an era in which the contending interests 
have been winnowed to those of management and finance. This political, 
economic, and legal order is a long way from the one that Berle and later 
Galbraith played such an influential role in creating. 
